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In this paper, I combine urban regime analysis and financialisation scholarships to uncover the role of 
planning and question the role of state actors in urban development processes. Through an analysis of 
CityLife in Milan and Tour and Taxis in Brussels, I argue that state actors have a strong agency in decision 
making as they own a critical resource: planning.  
My investigation reveals that, in projects characterised by uncertainty and internal conflicts, planning 
functions as a glue of development coalitions. Local governments mobilise it to bring together private and 
public interests, in order to achieve their agendas. Nevertheless, this glue function plays out differently in 
Milan and Brussels. While in Milan local administrations used planning to facilitate the anchoring of capital, in 
Brussels local governments enacted planning to shift the balance of power between them. This outcome 
reveals contextual differences that ultimately depend on local governance settings and planning systems.  
The comparison depicts the making of two different development regimes. CityLife indicates a financialised 
turn in governance, in which planning choices are driven mainly by economic – and financial – imperatives. 
Tour and Taxis symbolises an experimental entrepreneurial urban regime, a sort of “laboratory” to test new 
governance and planning frameworks.  
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Due to the current phase of fiscal austerity, state actors have become heavily dependent on financial capital 
to achieve their development goals and implement their political agendas. Scholars have produced an 
extensive amount of work on the role of finance and financial players in shaping urban development 
processes. But under which conditions does this happen? How do private players acquire the power to orient 
decision making? What is the agency of state actors? And, finally, how can we explain contextual 
differences? 
To address these research questions, I draw on urban regime analysis and the grounded accounts on the 
financialisation of urban development. Both approaches adopt an actor-oriented perspective to study how 
local governments cope with international competition and bargain with private players. They draw attention 
to local state structures as key sites in which ‘planning and redevelopment are implemented and political 
conflicts are mediated’ (Gotham 2000, 209). Lastly, they provide theoretical lenses to understand the change 
in power relationships in the negotiations over planning regulations and urban projects. 
The article focuses on two urban development projects (UDPs) in Milan and Brussels: CityLife and Tour 
and Taxis. Their selection is in line with both the scientific literature on UDPs, that considers them as 
symbols of entrepreneurial urban agendas, and with financialisation scholarships, that see them as engines of 
financial markets. Moreover, the two selected projects represent privileged sites to study the restructuring of 
local governance as they have been promoted by changing public-private partnerships.  
The analysis of CityLife and Tour and Taxis proves that state actors do not have a passive role in urban 
development. Planning represented a crucial resource for local authorities: as such, it was mobilised to 
enhance the stability of development coalitions, in order to bring together private and public interests for the 
implementation of their development agendas. In both cases, planning benefitted financial investors and 
property developers. However, in the case of Brussels, it was used as a leverage for local governments to 
affirm their authority in an institutional setting characterised by unbalanced power relationships. Therefore, 
the study underlines substantial contextual differences, depending on the specificities of governance settings 
and planning systems, as well as on the existence of a shared public political agenda. 
The comparison additionally shows the interplay between UDPs and the making of two different European 
development urban regimes. The case of CityLife calls into question whether the city is experiencing a shift 
to a financialised governance, aimed to promote Milan as an international city and a major target for real 
estate investments. Tour and Taxis, instead, has represented a sort of planning laboratory, a key arena to 
redefine local governance and planning, in order consolidate the role of the Brussels Capital Region in urban 
development matters. 
The paper is organised as followed: in the first section I build my theoretical and analytical framework; in 
the second part, I outline the methodology and introduce the case studies; in the third and fourth sections, I 
present and analyse the cases; finally, I discuss the main findings. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Due to the current phase of fiscal austerity, state actors have become heavily dependent on financial capital 
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Halbert 2015; Weber 2010). In this process, planning has a clear role in directing the flow of interest‐bearing 
capital in the built environment’ (Waldron 2019, 689). Through specific land-use planning procedures, the 
state influences investments’ financial conditions (e.g. profitability) and affects financial intermediation 
(Halbert and Attuyer 2016), regardless of the socio-spatial impacts on the city. 
Hitherto scholars have produced an extensive amount of work on the role of finance and financial players 
in shaping planning frameworks and urban policies. But under which conditions does this happen? How do 
private players acquire the power to orient decision making? What is the agency of state actors? In the 
literature, these questions remain understudied. To answer them, urban development must be considered a 
“social phenomenon” (Logan and Molotch 1987, 1), a “politically loaded” process (Clark, Gutzon, Lund 
Hansen 2015 2015, 23), strongly embedded in institutional settings crafted to create a “good business 
climate” (Logan and Molotch 1987, 59) to anchor capital investments. In particular, it is unclear how 
changes in planning frameworks are entangled in broader processes of governance restructuring, and how the 
former affect power relationships, between financial players and state actors as well as within the state 
apparatus.  
Addressing these literature gaps requires the adoption of an analytical approach that, through a focus on 
actors’ agency (O’Brien, O’Neil, Pike 2019, 1295), brings to an understanding of the ways actors mediate 
their interests through planning. It additionally requires framing urban development within the political 
economy of the city as it depends, and is constrained, by ‘locally specific structures of opportunities’ 
(Halbert and Attuyer 2016, 7), namely multi-level state configurations and political agendas. Thus, in this 
contribution I combine a broader analysis of governance with the study of – financialised— urban 
development projects. 
I refer to Urban Regime Analysis (URA), a sociological and political theory ‘regarded as a particularly 
appropriate means’ to comprehend shifts in urban governance (Hall and Hubbard 1996, 156). URA’s core 
argument is that, in a context characterised by a turn ‘from managerialism to entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey 
1989), a necessary condition for any given urban policy is the foundation of development coalitions, 
composed of governmental and private actors endowed with different material (i.e. financial capital) and 
immaterial resources (i.e. technical-financial expertise and organisational capacity) (Stone 1993).  A 
“common scheme of cooperation” (Stone 2005), made of regulatory frameworks, fixes the rules according to 
which “public bodies and private interests function together” (Stone 1993, 6), thus gaining the power to 
(Stone, 1993) orient the political agenda and achieve their interests, i.e. what Stone (1993, 2004, 2005).  
refers to as ‘regime’. Planning is at the centre of the analysis: through it, development regimes ‘promote 
growth or counter decline’ by linking private investments to public action (Stone 1993, 19).  
The main argument of this paper is that state actors do not play a passive role in urban development 
matters. Planning represents a crucial resource for local governments to shape power relationships within the 
coalitions. As such, it is mobilised to promote the stability of development coalitions, by bringing together 
private and public interests towards the implementation of specific political agendas. To validate my 
hypothesis, I develop my analysis on urban development projects (UDPs). Implemented through flexible 
planning frameworks, they play a major role in entrepreneurial models of urban growth (Harvey 1989; Diaz 
Orueta and Fainstein 2008), thus becoming crucial policy tools to enhance the international appeal of the city 
(Ponzini and Nastasi 2011). From a political point of view, UDPs are the result of ‘coalition politics’ 








profound power struggles and position-taking of key economic, political, social or cultural elites’ 
(Swyingedouw, Moulaert, Rodriguez 2002, 563). All this considered, UDPs are privileged sites to study:  
a) how ‘neoliberal systems of governance are crafted and through which a new articulation of regulatory 
and governmental scales is produced’ (Swyngedouw et al. 2002, 546); 
 b)  how power relationships unfold in the so-called ‘trading rooms’ (Theurrilat, Vera-Buchel, Crevoisier 
2016), i.e. during negotiations (Mosciaro 2020; Savini and Aalbers 2016; Guironnet et al. 2015; Guironnet 
and Halbert 2014). 
Recent financialisation scholarships additionally contend that UDPs are ‘one of the engines of financial 
markets’ (Savini and Aalbers 2016, 2) as for the tendency of private and public actors to treat land as 
financial assets. Scholars point to the de-contextualization of land-use planning as one of the consequences 
of the entrance of financial actors in governance matters. Local governments tend to employ planning in an 
instrumental way, to ‘facilitate the influx of financial investments’ (Ivi, 3), without taking into consideration 
the local socio-political contexts and, therefore, the real social demand of inhabitants. They do so either by 
defining more flexible legal procedures or by adjusting land-use to meet private requests. The latter often 
have to do with financial calculations on expected returns, that “rarely take into consideration the complexity 
and uncertainty of urban projects” (Ibidem) but rather depend to the risks associated with the management of 
larger real estate portfolios. 
In the case of of Saint-Ouen, a Red Belt municipality in the periphery of Paris, Guironnet et al. (2015) 
conclude that this instrumental approach to urban planning is particularly evident when capital investors own 
the land to be redeveloped. In these situations, investors acquire a leading role, not only in the phase of 
development but also in orienting strategic planning decisions (Ibidem). ‘This’, they state, ‘has important 
policy implications, since power relationships in the definition and implementation of urban redevelopment 




The article is built on a comparative research design, based on a diverse case selection strategy. Milan and 
Brussels have acquired a leading regional role in the world economy and represent important business and 
service centres. Yet they followed distinct development trajectories: while Milan has emerged on the 
international scene only over the last two decades, Brussels has long been considered a secondary world city 
for its status of Capital of Europe (Corijn and van de Ven 2013; Taylor 2006). In addition to that, the 
transition to service and business economy has been driven by distinct sectors: the administrative sector in 
the case of Brussels (Corijn and Vloeberghs 2013; Papadopoulos 2006; Baeten 2001) and finance, real estate, 
fashion, design, research and communication in Milan (Andreotti 2019; Bigatti 2016; Gibelli 2016a, 2016b).  
The cases differ for their governance and planning systems. In Milan, the implementation of a regional 
law in 1999 launched Programmi Integrati d’Intervento (PIIs), highly flexible instruments that refer to 
specific metropolitan areas and are subject to negotiations between local governments and their private 
partners. Due to that, the city has experienced an intense process of restructuring through UDPs (Anselmi 
and Vicari Haddock 2020; Mosciaro 2020; Kaika and Ruggiero 2013). By contrast, Brussel’s local 
governance is characterised by fragmentation and overlapping competences among the Capital Region and 
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large-scale operations. Nevertheless, in 2015, a federal reform was introduced to simplify planning 
procedures, mitigate conflicts among local authorities, and regionalise planning competences. 
In order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the issues proposed, I identified two UDPs: CityLife 
and Tour and Taxis. Their selection is in line with the literature on UDPs that sees the latter as symbols of 
the post-industrial transition of urban economies as well as of the shift from managerial to entrepreneurial 
forms of governance. Both projects are located in highly strategic areas. CityLife is a 36-ha site in the West 
of the city (Figure 1), rising in the area of the historical fair district of Milan. Tour and Taxis (T&T) is a 45-
ha complex, originally functioning as a multi-modal platform and gradually dismissed since the 1980s. It is 
located within the Canal Zone (Figure 2), a strategic area for the development of the whole regional territory. 
The development of CityLife and T&T has been driven by changing development coalitions comprising 
local authorities and a number of real estate operators and financial players (Mosciaro 2020; Brill and Conte 
2019; Vermeulen 2015; Van Criekingen and Vandermotten 2007). 
 
Figure 1 – Location of CityLife 
 
The collection of data, started in 2017 and ended in 2018, was based on the analysis of policy documents, 
annual corporate reports, community groups’ reports, and press articles. With respect to policy documents 
and corporate reports, I consulted land-use plans, master plans, and private companies’ annual reports. I 
relied on 45 semi-structured interviews with key informants (25 in Milan and 20 in Brussels): public 
officials, developers, real estate consultants and advisors, other stakeholders (e.g. Fiera Milano and the Port 
of Brussels), journalists, and community groups’ representatives. The interview guide followed the same 








urban/regional development agenda and on the UDP under study. Lastly, according to the specific profile 
and expertise of each informant, I posed specific questions to scrutinise project-related issues. 
 
 
Figure 2: Location of Tour and Taxis 
 
4. Framing Milan’s planning system within the entrepreneurial turn of the city 
 
Milan, the ‘industrial and financial epicentre of the country’ (Foot 2003, 9), has reinforced its leading 
economic status since the 1990s, thanks a to a strong diversification of the urban economy. At the turn of the 
new millennium, urban development, previously characterised by a strong public leadership (Savitch and 
Kantor 2002; Vicari and Molotch 1990), became the pillar of entrepreneurial strategies aimed to boost the 
international image of the city and attract investments in real estate.  
The gradual reform of the planning system played a key role in this process. It provided local authorities 
the power to transform several strategic large-scale brownfield areas and open the local real estate market to 
new investors (Bolocan Goldstein 2009). In 1999 the regional government introduced the Programma 
Integrato d’Intervento (PII), thus setting aside the rigid and state-led planning system of the past. In 2001, 
PIIs were followed by Documento di Inquadramento delle Politiche Urbanistiche – Ricostruire la Grande 
Milano (Comune di Milano 2001). The latter indicated the future development trajectories of Milan, along 
the West-East axis and between the urban core and the North-East of the city, and established a number of 
evaluation criteria for the approval of PIIs, such as environmental quality and provision of public amenities 
(Mazza 2007). It also specified that, in exchange of open negotiations and flexible timeframes, private actors 
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Hence, UPDs became a policy tool and a brand-new season of real estate operations began. New actors 
entered the Milanese real estate market i.e. insurance companies, financial intermediaries, mega-developers, 
and industrial groups converted to finance and real estate (Pasqui 2019; Memo 2010). Today the city is a 
major target for investments (Urban Land Institute and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2017). Between 2014 and 
2017 it attracted EUR 427,3 M of foreign investments (Scenari Immobiliari and Risanamento 2019). These 
figures will probably increase considering that, by 2030, it is expected that 1.3M m
2
 of the metropolitan area 




Up to the 1980s, the area of CityLife hosted Fiera Campionaria, an international exhibition centre and major 
symbol of the ‘made in Italy’ in the word (Maria Langoni 1997). The decision to move the fair must be 
traced back to the 1990s, when the regional government, the municipality of Milan and Fondazione Fiera 
(FF) decided to transfer it to the dismissed oil refinery of Rho-Pero, in the western outskirt of Milan. 
However, the operation did not start until the early 2000s, when the partners agreed that the costs to acquire 
and reclaim the area in Rho-Pero, expected to be about 750 million EUR (Mosciaro 2018), had to be covered 
by the sale of the historical fair district. 
Having established the price of the area (EUR 310 million), in April 2003, FF launched an international 
call for proposal on Il Sole 24 Ore, an Italian newspaper. The selection went through different stages. At 
first, FF and its public partners shortlisted the proposals on the basis of the participants’ core competence, 
financial capability, and expertise (Roth and Artusi 2005). After the preselection, proponents presented their 
economic offer and business plan, indicating time and costs of the operation. Among the finalists, the pool of 
actors headed by Generali Group proposed the highest offer (EUR 523 million). At the end of 2004, the 
project CityLife, designed by prestigious international architects (Zaha Hadid, Libeskind, Isozaki), won the 
competition. In this way, FF was able to make around EUR 213 million profit, money that was reinvested in 
the operation in Rho-Pero. 
The result of the call paved the way for the transfer of the property from FF to the CityLife Spa, a special 
purpose vehicle created by the winning financial consortium. The latter was initially composed of financial 
companies and developers: among the former, Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà (RAS Spa)—which sold its 
shares to Allianz in 2005—and Generali Group; among the latter, the Spanish group LAR, Lamaro Appalti, 
and Progestim -Società Immobiliare S.p.A. The first negotiation led to adoption of the PII Quartiere Storico 
Fiera Milano ed Aree Adiacenti in 2005. According to it, the area would have comprised 195,896 m
2
 of 
residential units, 84, 034 m
2 
of office space, 16,000 m
2
 of retail, 15,578 m
2 
of public amenities (Comune di 
Milano 2005). The plan additionally defined that CityLife Spa would have financed two museums and a park 
(EUR 69 million) (Brenna 2013).  
The PII was revised in October 2008, when the financial crisis hit the Milanese real estate market. The 
variant, explicitly aimed at coping with the changing economic conditions, included ‘some flexible 
indications that would have guaranteed a better organisation of the space and the execution of the plan’ 
(Comune di Milano 2013, 3, Author’s translation). Indeed, it decreased the residential, retail and office 
volumes. Given the lacking accessibility of the site, the two partners made a deal on the construction of a 
new metro station (Comune di Milano 2013): local authorities would have financed the infrastructure, in 








construction of public facilities, such as the kindergarten and Modern Art Museum (Comune di Milano 
2005).  
Soon after the works of the first residential units started, while the consortium was gradually falling apart. 
The project was at a standstill. The housing stock could not find a niche in the Milanese real estate market 
(Brenna 2013). Some members of CityLife Spa could no longer sustain bank loans as financial risks were 
mainly concentrated in the residential sector. 
 
“From 2003 to 2005, residential demand fell by 20-30% (up to 50%). This was significant! Investing 
in the residential sector when the market had fallen by 50% became difficult. They made some 
assessments. Then we must also consider the scarce component of other destinations compared to 
residential. The former ensures that the risk is distributed across multiple segments. Having a risk 
centered on the residential sector at a time of crisis has led many to slip away. […] banks require a 
return on investment and, if the agreed times are not respected, they demand it anyway” (Interview 
with a real estate consultant, Author’s translation). 
 
2013 marked a turning point with the implementation of the last variant and the acquisition of the property 
by Generali Group. The latter asked to further postpone the completion of the project to 2016. In exchange, 
the municipality of Milan was assured on the completion of the park and other public works (Comune di 
Milano 2013). Due to the recovery of the Milanese real estate market, CityLife Spa slowly –but gradually—
brought the process to an end: the park was open to the public in 2016 and the office towers were acquired 
by Allianz (for about EUR 285 million) and Generali (for about EUR 286 million) (Mosciaro 2018). The 
retail space was completed and open in November 2017. Finally, the construction of the last office tower, 
which was previously suspended, finally started in May 2018, when the municipality and CityLife Spa found 
a tenant, Price Water Cooper (PwC), and signed the last operational convention. 
 
6. Understanding Brussels’ planning system: institutional fragmentation in a 
socio-spatial divided context 
 
The status of Brussels as a small world city is intrinsically related to its designation as Capital of Europe. 
The city also plays a key role within the Belgian federal state, characterised by the coexistence of two 
linguistic communities and three regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels Capital Region (BCR). 
Created in 1989, the BCR is composed of 19 autonomous municipalities and defined by a double layered 
institutional structure: while communities are in charge of people-related issues, the regional government is 
competent in territorial matters (e.g. economy, spatial planning). The Europeanisation of Brussels was 
accompanied by a long wave of large-scale office development, which had a twofold effect: while giving a 
great impetus to the economy, it left the city with a highly divided socio-spatial structure (Kesteloot 2000). 
The latter became the main development priority of the regional government that identified the broader 
Canal Zone as a major development target. 
In relation to UDPs, the case of Brussels tells a different story than Milan. On the one hand, the legacy of 
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hand, the adoption of the Ordinance of Urban Planning in 1991 did not foresee any solution for the 
overlapping competences between the region and the 19 municipalities. Indeed, the absence of specific 
planning tools and conflicting visions have slowed down, and even impeded, any large-scale operations.  
Yet, since the 1990s the BCR gradually set the stage for a regionalisation of planning competences, with 
the introduction of a number of strategic and operational plans aimed to leveling out socio-spatial 
inequalities and bringing back tax paying population. The region identified a number of zones of regional 
interests (among which Tour and Taxis), with the Plan Régional d’Affectation du Sol (PRAS) in 2001, and 
implemented a master plan, the Schéma Directeur, in 2009. Nevertheless, these frameworks did not bring to 
any binding land-use plans. Because of that, when the Sixth State Reform on the Politique des Grandes 
Villes and the Code Bruxelloise de l’Aménagement du Territoire were introduced, the BCR revised planning 
procedures in order to gain more competences in the development of large-scale areas (Nassaux 2018).  
 
7. Tour and Taxis 
 
T&T is located in the municipality of Brussels and within the Canal Zone, close to the city centre and the 
North Station – one of the main commuting nodes of the city-region. Up to the 1980s, the site functioned as 
an important logistics platform connecting the port of Antwerp to Charleroi. Today, it is a ‘new district’ in 
Brussels (La Fonderie 2010), standing as a symbol of the rebirth of the Canal Zone.  
The complexity and the governance system of the BCR has found a clear expression in the development of 
T&T. Unlike CityLife, the conversion of the area has been characterised by cycles of investments and 
disinvestments (Van Criekingen and Vandermotten 2007), ‘unclear planning procedures’ (Vermeulen 2015, 
217), conflicting visions between public authorities, and a highly fragmented ownership structure (Ibidem). 
In the 1990s, the site was owned by the Ministry of Finance, the national railway company, and the Port of 
Brussels. Throughout that decade, three different culture-led plans were proposed but not finalised, because 
of lacking financial resources and a strong opposition by civil society (Brill and Conte 2019; Vermeulen 
2015; La Fonderie 2010; Van Criekingen and Vandermotten 2007). In 2000, the property was acquired by a 
joint venture ‘Project T&T NV’ composed of Leasinvest NV, a subsidiary of the Belgian holding company 
Ackermans and van Haaren (AvH), Robelco NV, and IRET development. The venture proposed the Master 
Plan HOK, designed by an American Architectural firm and a Brussels-based architectural office, in which 
the culture-led design was put aside in favour of a mixed-use development.  
In the meantime, the regional government and the municipality of Brussels proposed a few plans for the 
area: while the BCR recognised T&T as a strategic regional site (2001 PRAS), the municipality of Brussels, 
competent for the delivery of building permits, approved its own local land-use plan (2001 Plan Particulier 
d’Affectation du Sol-PPAS). The latter was not well received for the scarce involvement of community 
groups in the decision-making process, and the insufficient focus on social and public amenities (BRAL 
2017). In contrast with the vision of the municipality of Brussels, the new social-democrat coalition at BCR 
accepted citizens’ requests and, in 2004, launched a public call for a Masterplan and a number of 
participatory events (Ibidem). This brough to a non-binding regional Master Plan – the 2008 Schéma 
Directeur, and to a regional Decree in 2009, through which the developer obtained building rights for 37-ha 








Nevertheless, the renovation only started in 2012 because negotiations suffered a number of setbacks due 
to internal conflicts within the partnership. On the public side, local authorities disagreed on what to do. In 
particular, the municipality of Brussels, that was also directly involved in another competing large-scale 
operations (i.e. the Neo Project in Hysel), was hesitant enough to enact a binding land-use plan. On the 
private side, the joint venture could not reach a common vision, given the different investment attitudes as 
well as the lacking flexibility of the planning instruments. The situation within the partnership changed when 
the Extensa Group, another subsidiary of Ackermans and vaan Haaren (already within the board of the joint 
venture since 2001), entered the process, thus becoming major shareholder. Meanwhile, the election of a new 
Master Architect at the regional planning agency was a prelude to a political change in the management of 
strategic UDPs. A new political agenda was finally put forward and experimented, for the first time, in the 
case of T&T: in order to give the region more bargaining power, the logic was to consult all stakeholders, 
make arrangements, and give municipal authorities detailed instructions for the delivery of building permits. 
 
“The kind of support that the Master Architect gives is not only about making good architecture, but 
also about improving the way the building permits are delivered. He always says: “I want to jump into 
a project before the building permit stage so that afterwards, when the building permits are introduced, 
we will have consulted all stakeholders, we will have given our remarks and then we can make deals, 
respecting the public enquiry” (Interview with a planner working at the BCR#1) 
 
The BCR and the Extensa Group finally reached a compromise: the development of the area would have 
gone through a feasibility study and a public competition; in exchange, the region would have worked for the 
implementation of a municipal land-use plan. The latter was finally introduced in 2017, nearly 8 years after 
the regional framework (i.e. Schéma Directeur). From then on, the site could finally head to its completion.  
 
8. The role of planning in UDPs: a glue of development coalitions ? 
 
CityLife and T&T confirm the argument that planning is a crucial resource for local governments. The two 
cases illustrate that coalitions’ internal balance of power depends, in the first place, on what Halbert and 
Attuyer (2016) call the local structures of opportunities, such as the specific local institutional architectures 
and the existence of a shared public political agendas. Yet they finally show that planning changes are 
instrumentally enacted to shift power relationships, in order to promote the stability of public-private 
partnerships. 
In Milan, due to the transfer of planning competences to local authorities, the Lombardy region and the 
municipality of Milan took the control over urban development. The case of CityLife points to the key role 
of the regional authority in the initial phase of the operation, when it offered FF the opportunity to move to 
Rho-Pero. 
 
“The Lombardy region gave us a kind of order: if you decide to go outside Milan you should go to 
Rho because this would allow us to clean up an area that had been the headquarter of one of the oldest 
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unbearable burden, and reclaimed a problematic area of the Milanese belt” (Interview with Fiera, 
Author’s translation). 
 
The change in the regulatory framework set the stage for the consolidation of a ‘planning by project 
tradition’, which set aside the statutory planning system in favour of more flexible instruments (i.e. PIIs). 
The case of CityLife clearly shows that local governments were aligned on the political agenda and that there 
were no conflicting visions on what to do with the area. Planning was an important pawn, jointly played by 
local administrations, to facilitate the anchoring of capital and the transformation of the historical fair 
district. 
 
“We have a very important area, and we want excellent or emblematic proposals to be made, but we 
don't want to impose anything in the first place. We prefer to collect private proposals and, of course, 
dialogue and choose” (Interview with municipal councillor, Author’s translation). 
 
The first PII variant, for instance, did not include any specification about the functions to be allocated in the 
area, thus leaving ample room for manoeuvre to private proponents. 
 
“The first urban variant only indicated what should not have been done and not what should have been 
done. In the new settlement […]. It was not possible to establish congestive functions. Otherwise, it 
was possible to do residential, retail or tertiary space. The important thing was to privilege the 
functional mix” (Interview with municipal councillor, Author’s translation). 
 
By contrast, in Brussels, the hierarchical planning system and the divergent interests of local authorities 
did not favour the definition of a shared public political agenda. In this case, planning was an important card 
played by local governments to shift the balance of power between them. The BCR could not implement a 
binding land-use plan, although it attempted to introduce strategic plans for the development of the site (e.g. 
PRAS and Schéma Directeur). However, such attempts were not followed by the delivery of building 
permits by the municipality of Brussels. As a matter of fact, after the Schéma Directeur was approved in 
2008, it took almost 9 years for the approval of a local land-use plan.  
This delay, as one of my interviewees noted, raises doubts about the whole public procedure: “And then 
you ask: «Is that a regional planning or is it the results of private initiatives?»” (Interview with a planner). It 
also calls into question the role of the municipality of Brussels that has historically enjoyed greater decision-
making power, for its status of federal and regional Capital City. The City of Brussels was engaged in two 
competing large-scale operations: in T&T, as land-use regulator, and in the Neo Project, as both land-use 
regulator and property developer. Delivering the building permits on T&T would have potentially 








Nevertheless, the governance settings gradually evolved from the 2010s: the approval of the Sixth State 
Reform in 2015 empowered the BCR, through the creation of regional planning agencies (e.g. 
perspective.brussels) and the adoption of a new planning code on large-scale sites. 
 
“There’s been a choice to further empower the region, so to ease off the municipalities (which are not 
necessarily well staffed and competent). Basically now, all major projects, having more than 200 
parking lots, are automatically granted by the region (whereas before they used to be instructed by the 
municipalities). It must be said that the BCR is quite young: it dates back to 1989 and is progressively 
growing. The municipality of Brussels has often been named a «feudal castle», because it was only 
looking at its own territory (which has made it very messy at the regional scale)” (Interview with a 
planner working at BCR#1). 
In both cases, development coalitions have been quite unstable. While in Milan this mainly depended on 
the lacking coordination among the shareholders of CityLife Spa; in the case of T&T, the coalition’s hold 
was also undermined by an insufficient coordination among public authorities. CityLife Spa’s structure 
underwent numerous internal reorganisations over the years. The Lar Group left quite early as it was not in 
line with the business plan of the consortium (Mosciaro 2020). The end of the collaboration with Progestim 
in 2011 was due to political and judicial scandals involving its manager as well as to the difficulty to cope 
with the effects of the crisis. The costs for completing the project significantly raised from the 1.7 billion 
EUR, set in 2005, to more than 2.1 billion EUR, at the end of 2009. The financial leverage decreased, which 
implied that shareholders could no longer count on banks credits but should have directly financed the 
project. While the initial agreement set that the operation would have been covered mainly by bank credits 
and 20% by shareholder investment, ‘under the new agreement banks would provide only 67% and the 
shareholders the remaining 33%’ (Mosciaro 2018). Finally, in 2013 the Generali Group acquired all the 
shares, thus taking the control of CityLife Spa. With only one major shareholder, the situation changed quite 
drastically, and the project could start again. 
 
“At the beginning, the group included operating partners who commanded and guided everything. 
With the crisis, the decision-making process was frozen, and the development was no longer possible. 
When Generali took over, the development restarted because that represented an opportunity to re-
start. And it actually was!” (Interview with the developer, Author’s translation) 
 
In general, local authorities enacted planning to sustain private investment strategies and the coalition’s 
hold. If we consider the first negotiations on the moving of the fair to Rho-Pero, local governments 
derogated from what prescribed in Documento di Inquadramento about the density of the historical fair 
district, to allow FF to make a more profitable deal from the sale of the area. Instead of granting a density 








. This calculation enabled FF to make 
substantial cash to finance the operation in Rho-Pero (Mosciaro 2020; Brenna 2013). Later on, local 
authorities adjusted land-use to meet CityLife Spa’s requests. The 2008 PII variant revised the residential 
and tertiary plots within the master plan, and foresaw a new metro station, mainly financed by the public 
sector. The PII was again modified in the coming years, in order to postpone the completion of the project to 
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operational convention to further postpone the end of construction works. Figure 3 clearly shows that PII 
variants occurred almost simultaneously to CityLife Spa’s internal changes, thus validating the hypothesis 
that they were the results of private demands. 
Figure 3: Planning procedures and CityLife Spa’s shareholder structure (2005-2019) 
 
 
T&T development was also affected by internal tensions within the joint venture, because of different 
development ideas (“Each one had their ideas and visions, but they didn’t like the sun to shine for the other” 
–Interview with developer#2) and, most importantly, expectations of the on their investments.  
 
“The conflict was not so much on the vision for the development of the area. In fact, it was more about 
different attitudes. If you are a developer of this kind of project and have a problem in investing small 
money, then this means that you already have a problem. It’s going to be a bit longer, it’s a long-term 
process. You cannot say: “I want my money now!” and things like that. That is not going to work” 
(Interview with developer#1) 
 
As in the case of CityLife, the internal tensions within joint venture affected the whole process. The situation 
eventually changed when the Extensa Group became major shareholder. 
 
“The process has evolved according to the owner. In the past, different shareholders that did not agree 
on everything so the process was very long. I have the feeling that thigs have changed since 2013 and 










Due to the 2015 reform, the BCR gradually acquired a more influential role than the municipality of 
Brussels. The rebalancing of power within the coalition was therefore fundamental for the identification of a 
common vision on the development of the site, and for the delivery of building permits in 2017 (Figure 4): 
‘Since May 2017, there’s a framework and we can’t argue about it any longer. That’s the basis and it helps 
the negotiation’ (Interview with a planner working at BCR#2). 
 
Figure 4: Main planning instruments and T&T ownership structure (2000-2019) 
 
In line with the financialisation literature on UDPs, in both cases planning decisions were ‘de-
contextualised’ (Savini and Aalbers 2016; Guironnet et al. 2015): on the one hand, they came at the expenses 
of more distributional goals; on the other hand, they seemed not be based on a clear evaluation of local 
needs. In both cases, negotiations benefitted private developers. In Milan, for instance, social housing was 
never at stake and the municipality also showed a certain weakness in negotiating public amenities. Local 
authorities modified planning frameworks to enable their partners to postpone the end of construction works 
and build more or less residential plots/office space when it best suited them. When the PII was revised in 
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In Brussels, private actors took advantage from the tensions between the municipality of Brussels and the 
BCR on the inclusion of public amenities and social housing. If we consider the former, the City of Brussels 
demanded 10% of public amenities, while the BCR asked 5%. The 2017 local land-use plan recognised the 
regional alternative (18,500 m
2 
min), but discussions on building fees remained open. The residential 
function was initially included in the 2008 Schéma Directeur and then left out in the 2009 Decree. These two 
episodes again reveal the contested nature of planning in Brussels. According to a regional planner, the cut in 
social housing was a political move. The municipality of Brussels never demanded it: “The City of Brussels 
has already a lot of social housing. Thus, a priori we haven’t demanded social housing because we wanted 
mix” (interview with a planner from the municipality of Brussels). The fact that, after the 2008 Schéma 
Directeur, negotiations were carried out between the regional Minister President and the owner of T&T 
suggest that, before the 2009 Decree, there was another deal between the region and the City of Brussels. 
 
“The negotiations, which occurred after that master plan [Schéma Directeur], were carried out on a 
pretty high level, basically between the Minister President and the owner. These negotiations ended up 
in that decree which no longer stipulated that there had to be social housing. So again, this is a matter 
of negotiations! Public authorities were a bit weak” (Interview with a planner working at BCR#1) 
 
As a result, the 2018 plan encompasses only subsidised housing, that will cover 44,000 m
2
 (30% of the total 
number of dwellings). Yet, also in this case, the matter is still included in the discussions on building fees 
(BRAL 2017).  
 
9. Conclusion: two European regimes in the making 
 
In contrast to the literature assigning a passive role to state actors in financialised urban development 
processes, the analysis of CityLife and Tour and Taxis proves that state actors do have a strong agency in 
decision making. The adoption of URA’s analytical framework (Stone 1993, 2004, 2005) was paramount to 
reveal that, despite the initial imbalanced dotation of material resources (i.e. capital) in favour of their 
private partners, state actors owns a crucial resource: planning. Through it, they succeed in anchoring capital 
investments to their entrepreneurial political agendas, while ensuring the functioning of development 
coalitions.  
Planning functions as a glue in urban development processes. As such, it is instrumentally mobilised to 
shape power relationships, in projects characterised by growing uncertainty and the withdrawal of partners. 
Nevertheless, this glue function plays out differently in Milan and Brussels. In the Italian case, the presence 
of converging interests between local authorities meant that planning was crafted to maintain the profitability 
of investments, so to allow CityLife Spa to carry out the real estate operation. In the Belgian case, planning 
negotiations not only had to take this aspect into account, but also had to lead to a resolution of local 
governments’ disputes.  
This outcome depends on the cities’ different local structures of opportunities (Halbert and Attuyer 2016). 
Firstly, while in Milan planning reform delegated, and clearly defined, planning competences, in Brussels 








city at the international scale, also through UDPs. PIIs were designed for this very purpose. On the contrary, 
in the Belgian case, planning did not provide for any flexible tools for this kind of operations, which 
remained at the mercy of local governments’ “power games”. This was further complicated by the fact that 
the municipality of Brussels and the BCR always struggled to find a solution for their conflicting interests on 
the area. 
By showing the role of planning in UDPs, the comparison depicts the making of two different European 
development regimes. In Milan, urban regeneration through large-scale projects has represented the core of 
the entrepreneurial city management approach since the 1990s (Anselmi and Vicari 2020; Mosciaro 2020; 
Gonzales 2009). The affirmation of the so-called ‘planning by project tradition’ was meant to open the real 
estate market to capital investments and put in practice new forms of private and public collaborations. The 
final objective was to position the city on the map, thereby increasing its competitiveness in the global real 
estate market. CityLife is an emblematic example of this process. Its analysis opens a new question on the 
shift to a financialised governance of UDPs, in which planning choices are driven by economic – and 
financial – imperatives, and local governments increasingly embrace finance logics and depoliticise the 
decision-making process (Theurrilat et al. 2016, 1510).  
In the case of Brussel, T&T is the symbol of an experimental (Lauermann 2016) entrepreneurial urban 
regime. The project represented a sort of “laboratory” to test the functioning of local governance and 
planning frameworks. Its contested development led the regional government to take a step forward in the 
transformation of strategic areas and in the definition of new planning tools. This process, which began in 
2015, resulted in the introduction of Plans d’Aménagement Directeur in 2018. The latter override the 
hierarchical system and represents the only framework for the regeneration of large-scale strategic sites. 
Lastly, they relegate municipal plans to a marginal position, in order to entrust the region with more 
negotiating and decision-making power. This marks the continuation of a regime change that began with 
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